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ABSTRACT 
 Crew fatigue is a major factor in mishaps aboard ships. Despite empirical 
evidence that fewer personnel and longer working hours are primary factors of crew 
fatigue, U.S. Navy budgeting constraints and increased automation on ships has resulted 
in reduced manning onboard Navy vessels. This study expands research by Haynes 
(2007) and Mason (2009) comparing the Navy Standard Workweek (NSWW) Model to 
Sailors’ self-reported activities onboard U.S. Navy destroyers and cruisers. Research by 
both Haynes (2007) and Mason (2009) showed that a majority of Sailors worked longer 
hours and received less sleep than allotted in the NSWW model. The objective of this 
study was to determine if similar patterns would exist onboard U.S. Navy frigates. 
Results indicated that 61% of the participants exceeded the 81 hours of Available Time 
(work) allotted by the NSWW. On average, Sailors in this current study, excluding 
officers, worked 20.24 hours more per week than in the NSWW, while sleeping 8.98 
fewer hours per week than in the NSWW. Results suggest that the NSWW does not 
accurately reflect Sailors’ work/rest patterns onboard ships. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 Within the U.S. Navy today, budget constraints are dictating that the U.S. Navy 
pursue a smaller total force.  This reduction in force compels the U.S. Navy to limit the 
number of personnel assigned to vessels. However, at the same time as the U.S. Navy is 
experiencing a reduction in force, it is also experiencing building more ships. This 
increase in the total number of ships compounds the issues involved with reduced 
manning of those vessels. With more ships and fewer personnel, U.S. Navy leadership 
must weigh Operational Risk Management (ORM) factors in planning for the future.   
 In order to mitigate these ORM issues with this ever-increasing issue of proper 
manning of U.S. Naval vessels, some have championed automation and more technically 
advanced systems to reduce the burden upon the Sailors. However, literature suggests the 
presence of automated transportation systems is associated with unpredictable levels of 
individual performance among the crew members (Dinges, 1995). Other research 
indicates when left alone, fatigued watchstanders are more likely to rely on the automated 
systems to function properly, rather than developing their own situational awareness. 
Crew fatigue is a reoccurring theme in several papers as a major factor in mishaps aboard 
ships (Brown 1989; Smith, Lane and Bloor, 2001; Miller 2005; Houtman, Miedema, 
Jettinghoff, Starren, Heinrich, Gort, Wulder and Wubbolts, 2005; Arendt, Middleton, 
Williams, Francis, and Luke, 2006).   
 To mitigate the issues surrounding fatigue, Naval Manpower Analysis Center 
(NAVMAC), as the primary agent for the U.S. Navy, works with Type Commanders and 
Warfighting Enterprises to determine and document ships’ manning requirements. The 
critical driver in developing ship manning documents is the Navy Standard Work Week 
(NSWW).  The NSWW accounts for all hours within a week (168 hours) for assignment 
or use by a Sailor.  It is broken down into Available (81 hours) and Non-available (87 
hours) time. Proper manning is determined by evaluating the amount of work  
required to operate a specific ship type (expressed in hours per week) and evaluating the 
amount of work by the NSWW per Sailor to yield the number of Sailors required to 
accomplish the work. 
 xvi
This research was an observational study of Sailors’ work/rest patterns aboard 
USS RENTZ (FFG 46). The data collected was used to conduct a comparative analysis of 
Sailors’ actual recorded work/rest patterns to the NSWW model. This thesis found that 
RENTZ participants, excluding officers, on average, worked 20.24 hours per week in 
excess of the hours set forth in the NSWW model, while sleeping 8.98 fewer hours per 
week than mandated by the NSWW. Overall, 61% of participants exceeded the Available 
Time allotted in the NSWW model. Similar results were found on U.S. Navy cruisers and 
destroyers during Haynes’s (2007) and Mason’s (2009) studies. In light of these findings, 
this study recommends the following future research: (1) this research be repeated over a 
longer time span and in varying conditions to validate these findings; (2) use a larger 
sample of the population aboard additional frigates and other vessel types; (3) conduct a 
study specifically targeting the sleep patterns of higher-ranking Officers and enlisted 
Sailors; and (4) all research be conducted in tandem with the Improved Performance 
Research Integration Tool (IMPRINT), a task network modeling tool. Overall, 
recommendations to the U.S. Navy include: (1) educate all Sailors on the effects of 
fatigue, and (2) revisit the current NSWW to determine if the current model is a good fit 
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You must not needlessly fatigue the troops. 
Napoleon Bonaparte 
Crew fatigue is a major factor in mishaps aboard ships (Brown, 1989; Smith, 
Lane, & Bloor, 2001; Miller, 2005; Houtman, Miedema, Jettinghoff, Starren, Heinrich, 
Gort, Wulder, & Wubbolts, 2005; Arendt, Middleton, Williams, Francis, & Luke, 2006). 
Symptoms of fatigue are increased anxiety, decreased work effectiveness and efficiency, 
and decreased vigilance (Mohler, 1966; Dinges, 1995; National Sleep Foundation, 2006). 
Fatigued Sailors play a direct or indirect role in safety mishaps, collisions, and near 
misses afloat (Smith et al., 2001). According to a recent review of fatigue-related ship 
accidents from 1996 to 2002, fatigue may be a causal factor in 11% to almost 23% of 
grounding and collision cases in European shipping (Houtman et al., 2005). Although the 
reasons for merchant ship collisions and near misses vary, a recurring theme is fatigue 
(Houtman et al., 2005). Additionally, Miller (2005) cites fatigue as a major or causal 
factor in 26 United States Air Force (USAF) Class A mishaps (a Class A mishap is the 
loss of life or property damage of $1 million or more) from 1972 to 2000, costing the  
Air Force an average of $54 million per year. Fatigued Sailors can be costly for the  
U.S. Navy as well. 
A number of studies have found that reducing personnel on ships and working 
longer hours were primary factors causing crew fatigue (Brown, 1989; Smith et al., 2001; 
Miller, 2005; Houtman et al., 2005; Arendt et al., 2006). Two of the reasons that the 
United States Navy has reduced the number of Sailors aboard ships are budget constraints 
and the development of more technologically advanced ships. Budget constraints that are 
driving a smaller armed force, in part, are compelling the Navy to limit the number of 
personnel on existing ships. Conversely, while downsizing the Fleet’s personnel, the 
Navy is building more ships. The Navy’s move toward smaller crews aboard its vessels 
presents challenges such as increased crew workload, fatigue, decreased human 
performance, and consequently, difficulties with risk management. According to a Center 
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of Navy Analyses (CNA) 2002 report titled Inside the Black Box: Assessing the Navy’s 
Manpower Requirements Process, “if too few people are on board, the ship’s capability, 
readiness, and performance will suffer” (Moore, Hattiangadi, Sicilia, & Gasch, 2002, p. 
256). As a consequence, the challenge of delivering increased capabilities with reduced 
personnel limits the Navy’s ability to effectively complete its missions. Another 
justification for decreasing crew size is that today’s naval ships are more technologically 
advanced. Relying on the use of automated systems, today’s naval ships require fewer 
personnel. However, literature suggests that the presence of automated transportation 
systems is associated with unpredictable levels of individual performance among crew 
members (Dinges, 1995). Research further suggests that when left alone, fatigued 
watchstanders are more likely to rely on the automated systems to function correctly, 
rather than developing their own situational awareness. Fatigued Sailors can also result 
from improper scheduling of Sailors’ work/rest patterns (Dinges, 1995; Miller, 2005). 
Currently, military leaders are scheduling Sailors’ work/rest hours based upon a 
Navy Standard Workweek (NSWW) model that may not accurately reflect Sailors’ actual 
work/rest patterns onboard ship. A Navy’s workweek, for sea duty units, is based upon 
operational requirements projected during wartime conditions (OPNAVINST 1000.16K, 
2007). Haynes (2007) found that a majority of Sailors onboard CHUNG HOON obtained 
inadequate sleep and worked longer hours than allocated by the NSWW. Working long 
and unconventional hours increases the likelihood of accidents and poor performance 
such as sleeping on watch, misreading readouts, slow reaction to emergencies, and failure 
to follow procedures. Unconventional working hours are defined as hours outside the 
traditional working hours of 0900 to 1700 or rotating shifts (e.g., regularly changing 
working hours, three-section watch rotation) (Knutsson & Boggild, 2000). 
In a similar study, Mason (2009) found that Sailors on PORT ROYAL and  
LAKE ERIE, on average, worked more hours per week than allocated by the NSWW and 
obtained inadequate sleep. Shortly following the data collection of the Mason (2009) 
study, a U.S. Navy investigation cited a “sleep-deprived” skipper as one of the underlying 
factors leading to the PORT ROYAL’s grounding on February 5, 2009, causing an 
estimated $40 million in repairs to the ship (Cole, 2009). The Commanding Officer of 
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PORT ROYAL reportedly had only 15 hours of sleep in the three days preceding the 
ship’s grounding (Navy Times, 2009). Haynes and Mason both recommended that the 
current NSWW model be revised to more accurately reflect current and future Sailors’ 
work/rest patterns. 
This research seeks to expand the research scope of Haynes’s 2007 study on a  
U.S. Navy destroyer and Mason’s 2009 study on two U.S. Navy cruisers. The objectives 
of the current study are to (1) determine the actual work/rest patterns of Sailors aboard  
U.S. Navy frigates; (2) determine if the NSWW (afloat) accurately estimates the total 
number of hours Sailors work each week aboard U.S. Navy frigates; (3) determine if 
work/rest patterns differ among departments aboard U.S. Navy frigates; and  
(4) recommend whether the NSWW needs to be revised to more accurately reflect 
Sailors’ actual standard workweek by department. Two potential benefits of this research 
will be to (1) assist in ensuring that ships are properly manned to complete missions 
during times of peace and war by ensuring that the NSWW more accurately reflects 
Sailor’s activities, and (2) ensure Sailors’ work/rest patterns are properly scheduled so 
that Sailors obtain adequate amounts of sleep needed to perform at an optimal level. A 
limitation of this observational research is that it is conducted aboard a U.S. Navy frigate 
during a high-caliber underway evolution. This limitation may restrict generalization of 
findings to other U.S. Navy vessels during other operational conditions. 
The following chapter provides an overview of the literature related to sleep and 
fatigue circadian rhythms, shiftwork, operational risk management, the NSWW model, 
and previous research conducted on Sailors’ work/rest patterns aboard naval vessels. 
Chapter III describes the methods used in the thesis research. Chapter IV includes the 
results of the analysis while Chapter V contains the discussion of the results. Chapter VI 
gives the conclusion and recommendations from the study. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. FATIGUE 
Fatigue is defined as an “abstract term that describes an internal state of a human 
operator” (Miller, 2005, p. 1). Symptoms of fatigue include increased anxiety, decreased 
work efficiency, decreased short-term memory, slowed reaction time, reduced 
motivational drive, decreased vigilance, variable work performance, and increased  
risk-taking when time and pressure is added to the task (Battelle Memorial Institute, 
1998; Dinges, 1995; Mohler, 1966). Furthermore, fatigue negatively affects a Sailor’s 
judgment, slows reaction time, leads to poor situational awareness, and increases mental 
mistakes and memory errors (Dinges, 1995; Houtman et al., 2005). Overall, fatigue can 
adversely affect a Sailor’s performance, leading to an increase in accidents and mishaps 
onboard ships. 
Fatigue comes from inadequate amounts of sleep. When the brain receives lack of 
sleep, it experiences involuntary sleep episodes, known as “microsleeps,” which can last 
from half a second to 10 seconds. In the fast-paced, decision-making environments 
onboard a ship, 10 seconds is a significant amount of time. Dinges (1995) reports that 
during a 1-second lapse of attention caused by microsleep, a motor vehicle traveling at a 
rate of 60 mph covers 88 feet, a train at 120 mph travels 176 feet, and a plane flying at 
250 knots travels approximately 370 feet. A lapse of a couple of seconds onboard a naval 
vessel can have dire consequences, possibly resulting in the loss of human lives. Dinges 
(1995) indicates that “as sleepiness increases so also do microsleeps and performance 
lapses . . . as fatigue increases, the brain appears to fall asleep involuntarily, against the 
will of the operator” (p. 42). The longer an individual is awake without sleep beyond 14-
16 hours, the more frequent and longer in duration the lapses will be (Dinges, 1995). 
The literature shows that the adverse affects of fatigue among Sailors cannot be 
prevented by, and does not vary by, personality, education, training, motivation, or an 
individual’s professionalism (Dinges, 1995). Currently, the “best countermeasure to 
fatigue is sleep, which is the only countermeasure that provides full and complete  
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recovery. Importantly, sleep as a countermeasure reduces the probability that fatigue will 
affect mission safety and, concomitantly, reduces the exposure to fatigue” (Miller, 2005, 
p. 7). 
B. SLEEP 
Sleep is defined as partial or full unconsciousness during which time voluntary 
functions of the body are suspended, while the body rests and is restored (Encarta, 2007). 
Adequate amounts of sleep are necessary to ensure optimal performance among Sailors. 
Without adequate sleep, a Sailor’s performance may be substandard, consequently 
impacting mission effectiveness. The National Sleep Foundation (2006) reports that 
sleep-deprived humans will exhibit 
. . . excessive sleepiness, poor sleep, loss of concentration, poor motor 
control, slowed reflexes, nausea, and irritability . . . those who perform 
shiftwork [which is common on Navy vessels], particularly night shift, 
also may experience the effects of disrupted circadian sleep-wake cycle.  
(p. 8) 
Sleep patterns differ among adolescents and adults. Adults require approximately 
eight hours of sleep, while adolescents require 8.5 to 9.25 hours of sleep each night for 
optimal performance and to offset sleep debt (Miller et al., 2007; Anch, Browman, 
Mitler, & Walsh, 1998; Bouchier, 1999). This is important because many young people 
enlist in the Navy and, until they are fully grown, require considerably more sleep than 
their adult counterparts. 
The human brain experiences two basic categories of sleep: rapid eye movement 
(REM) and nonrapid eye movement (NREM) (Miller et al., 2007). NREM sleep consists 
of four stages. Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the stages of sleep by hour that an 
individual is a sleep. The primary stage of NREM, Stage 0, represents the stage in which 
an individual is fully awake. Stage 1 NREM sleep is when the individual begins to drift 
off, whereas Stage 2 NREM is an intermediate stage of sleep. Stage 3 is when an 
individual starts to fall into a deep sleep and Stage 4 NREM is the deepest stage of sleep. 




Figure 1. Sleep Cycle Over 8 Hours (From: Miller et al., 2007). 
Missing a single stage of sleep results in partial sleep deprivation (Miller et al., 
2007). Total sleep deprivation occurs when an individual is awake continuously without 
proper regenerative sessions of sleep (Miller et al., 2007). According to Shay (1998), 
sleep deprivation in a military domain enhances the possibility of catastrophic operational 
failure, fratricide, preventable noncombatant casualties, loss of emotional control, poor 
social judgment, and blind obedience to illegal orders. Overall, a Sailor’s sleep is 
regulated (i.e., the timing of sleep and wakefulness) by the number of hours of sleep, the 
number of hours awake, the amount of sleep debt, and the circadian rhythm (Eddy & 
Hursh, 2001). 
C. CIRCADIAN RHYTHM 
 An individual’s circadian rhythm controls numerous physiological factors in the 
human body such as core body temperature and endocrine functions. Military leaders 
need to be cognizant of Sailors’ circadian rhythms when scheduling their work and rest 
patterns, as an individual’s circadian rhythm is a vital element in predicting human 
performance (Battelle Memorial Institute, 1998; Dinges, 1995; Knutsson & Boggild, 
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2000; Eddy & Hursh, 2001; Miller, 2005). See Figure 2 for a graphical representation of 
some physiological processes controlled by the circadian rhythm. 
 
Figure 2. Alertness, Core Body Temperature, Hormone Secretion, and Melatonin 
Cycle Circadian Rhythms (From: McCallum, Sanquist, Mitler, & Krueger, 2003). 
Circadian rhythms are associated with alertness levels and are closely related to 
human performance. During the peak times, Sailors are highly alert and performance is 
optimal. Johnson, Duffy, Dijk, Ronda, Dyal, and Czeisler (1992) conducted research to 
determine the relationship between the circadian rhythm as measured by core body 
temperature, and its effect on short-term memory, subjective alertness, and cognitive 
performance. The results of their study indicate that when the circadian rhythm is at the 
lowest point and the core body temperature is low, substandard performance is present in 
all three areas. A report by the Battelle Memorial Institute (1998) suggests that human 
performance and mental processing decrease when an individual is operating at his or her 
circadian low point, further supporting the idea that when Sailors’ circadian rhythms are 
low, their performance will be degraded. A Sailor’s cognitive and physical effectiveness 
is directly affected by his or her circadian rhythm and sleep/wake pattern (Dinges, 1995; 
Miller, 2005). 
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Circadian desynchronization can occur due to lack of sleep and sleep deprivation 
due to inaccurate work/rest scheduling, longer working hours, and shiftwork. During this 
time, the individual is operating in a circadian trough (when alertness is at its lowest 
point) instead of at the crest (when alertness is at its peak). Consequences of circadian 
desynchronization include performance and safety concerns for seagoing vessels. Sailors 
experiencing circadian desynchronization will have disturbed sleep. If a Sailor’s 
circadian cycle is not synchronized, that individual’s alertness and situational awareness 
will be negatively affected. 
D. SHIFTWORK 
U.S. Navy vessels operate in a 24/7 environment and Sailors are subjected to 
changing sleep patterns, changes in time zones, long working hours, and unconventional 
working hours. Thus, Sailors frequently shift their sleep and work intervals or perform 
“shiftwork.” Shiftwork is defined as unconventional working hours or varying work 
hours outside of daytime hours (Knutsson & Boggild, 2000). This includes regularly 
changing work hours, three-section watch rotation, and evening and night work. Poor 
sleep cycles occur due to shiftwork because the body’s biological clock is not able to 
adapt to rapid changes in a work schedule (Arendt et al., 2006). Figure 3 illustrates the 
potential problems associated with shiftwork, including stress, strain, and intervening 
variables. 
 
Figure 3. Model of Potential Problems Associated with Shiftwork  
(From: Knutsson & Boggild, 2000). 
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In the civilian world, stress, social problems, behavioral problems (i.e., smoking 
and unhealthy eating habits), and disturbed circadian rhythms are all factors associated 
with shiftwork (Knutsson & Boggild, 2000). Shiftwork contributes to the 
desynchronization of an individual’s circadian rhythm, which can cause experiences of 
“jet lag” leading to tiredness, poor concentration, and depression (Knutsson & Boggild, 
2000). Empirical studies have linked shiftwork to increase in injuries on the job 
(Knutsson & Boggild, 2000; Smith, Folkard, & Poole, 1994). On-the-job injuries 
associated with shiftwork are more likely to occur at night because individuals’ circadian 
rhythm are unable to adjust to night shiftwork, negatively impacting individual 
performance and alertness. Several major disasters that occurred during nighttime hours 
(0000-0800) are Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Bhophal (Smith et al., 1994; Miller, 
2005; Miller, Matsangas, & Shattuck, 2007). Sleep studies have concluded, in part, that 
fatigued night-time operators contributed to these safety disasters (Jha, Duncan, & Bates, 
2001). 
A combination of fatigue, individuals not being able to adapt to shiftwork, and 
substandard performance can lead to costly incidents, safety errors, and lack of Sailor 
retention (Smith et al., 2001). Furthermore, Knutsson and Boggild (2000) suggest that the 
interaction between physical activity patterns associated with shiftwork and 
desynchronized circadian rhythms increase the risk of acute heart disease. See Figure 4 





Figure 4. Conceptual Model of Disease Mechanisms in Shiftworkers  
(From: Knutsson & Boggild, 2000). 
The long-term effects of shiftwork, as indicated in Figure 4, can become an 
additional medical cost for the Navy. Shiftwork can lead to mismatch of individuals’ 
circadian rhythm causing sleep and wake disturbances, internal circadian 
desynchronization, and stress which can increase an individual’s susceptibility to clinical 
illnesses (Knutsson and Boggild, 2000). 
E. NAVY STANDARD WORKWEEK (NSWW) (AFLOAT) 
It is important to assess the current model for scheduling Sailors’ work-rest 
patterns, since lack of sleep and fatigue can result from improper scheduling of those 
patterns.. The Manual of Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures, OPNAV 
INSTRUCTION 1000.16K (2007), provides primary guidance, policies, and procedures 
to develop, review, approve, implement, and update Total Force manpower for all naval 
activities. The Naval Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC) uses OPNAV 
INSTRUCTION 1000.16 as guidance for manning the Fleet. NAVMAC, primary agent, 
works with Type Commanders and Warfighting Enterprises to determine Fleet manpower 
requirements. The Navy Standard Workweek (NSWW) is a critical driver in developing a 
ship’s manning document (OPNAVINST 1000.16, 2007). 
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The NSWW for sea-going vessels is determined based upon operational 
requirements under projected wartime conditions. This model serves as a guideline for 
commanders to sustain personnel utilization under Conditions I, II, and III 
(wartime/forward deployment cruising readiness). The intent of the conditions is to reflect 
the limits of Sailors’ endurance (Williams-Robinson, 2007). At Condition I, the ship is at 
General Quarters (battle readiness), all personnel are continuously alert, and all watchstations 
are manned. Maximum expected crew endurance during Condition I is  
24 hours of continuous operations. At Condition II, Sailors’ maximum expected duration is 
10 days, with 4 to 6 hours of rest each day. While at Condition III, the ship is at wartime 
steaming and all essential navigational watches are manned, along with several additional 
watchstations. Maximum expected crew endurance during  
Condition III is 60 days, with 8 hours of rest per day. See Table 1 for maximum expected 
crew endurance during each condition. 
 
Readiness Conditions Wartime/Forward Deployed Cruising Readiness Requirements 
Condition I Sailors are expected to perform for up to 24 hours continuously 
Condition II 
The maximum expected duration is 10 days, with a minimum of 4 to 6 
hours of rest provided per man per day 
Condition III 
The maximum expected crew endurance is 60 days, with an opportunity 
for 8 hours of rest provided per man per day 
Table 1.   U.S. Navy Wartime Readiness Condition Chart (OPNAVINST 
9010.318B, 2007) 
A ship’s standard workweek consists of 168 hours (Table 2). The 168-hour 
workweek is divided into available (on duty) and nonavailable (off duty) hours. The 
Available Time per week is 81 hours, which includes watchstanding, work, training, and 
service diversion. Fifty-six hours are allocated for watchstanding, 14 hours are allocated for 
maintenance (productive work), 7 hours are allocated for training, and the remaining 4 hours 
are allocated for service diversion to include, but not limited to, meetings, administrative 
time, inspections, quarters, and sick call. Nonavailable Time per week consists of 87 hours 
which include sleep, messing, personal time, and free time on Sunday. Nonavailable 
Time is further broken down to 56 hours for sleep, 14 hours for messing,  
14 hours for personal time, and 3 hours for free time on Sunday. 
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Navy Standard Workweek (OPNAVINST 1000.16K) 
Ship Standard Workweek 81 Hours 
Productive Workweek(Note 1) 70 Hours 
Total Hours Available Weekly 168 Hours 
Less Nonavailable Time:   
Sleeping 56 Hours 
Messing 14 Hours 
Personal Time 14 Hours 
Sunday Free Time 3 Hours 
Less:   
Training (Note 2) 7 Hours 
Service Diversion (Note 3) 4 Hours 
Total Hours Available for 
Productive Work (Note 1) 70 Hours 
Note 1: For watchstanders, 56 hours is allocated to watch stations (8 hours X 7 days) (14 hours 
available for work in addition to 56 hours watchstanding = 70 hours) 
Note 2: Training is an activity of an instructional nature, which contributes directly to combat 
readiness and deducts from the individual's capability to do productive work. Training hours are 
factored to reflect those scheduled events (e.g., general drills, engineering casualty damage 
control) for all hands. Hours indicated have been standardized for Condition III in ship’s 
manning documents (SMDs). 
Note 3: Service diversion consists of actions required of military personnel regulations or the 
nature of shipboard/staff routine. Service diversion includes, but is not limited to, the following 
types of activities: 
• Quarters, inspections, and sick call. 
• Other administrative requirements including: Commanding Officers Non-
Judicial Punishment (NJP), participation on boards and committees, interviews, 
and non-training-related assemblies. 
• Flight and hangar deck integrity watches. 
Table 2.   Detailed Description of Navy Standard Workweek for Afloat (Wartime) 
Military Personnel (From OPNAVINST 1000.16K – Appendix C) 
 The NSWW was changed in 2001, following a CNA report. The change added 
three additional hours to productive work, while removing three hours from service 
diversion. Productive hours per week increased from 67 hours to 70 hours per week and 
service diversion decreased from seven to four hours per week. In essence, the change 
decreased manpower requirements, but did not reduce the workload required to properly 
operate the ship (Miller & Firehammer, 2007). 
The general assumption of the afloat NSWW is that a unit is steaming in 
Condition III, using a three-section watch rotation. The maximum endurance for Sailors 
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in Condition III is 60 days, with the opportunity for eight hours of rest per person per 
day. While at sea, watches are manned based upon the unit’s readiness condition. 
F. PREVIOUS STUDIES ON THE NAVY STANDARD WORKWEEK 
(NSWW) 
Haynes (2007) conducted a study on the CHUNG HOON to compare Sailors’ 
actual work/rest patterns to estimated work/rest patterns of the NSWW. His results 
suggest that the NSWW model does not accurately reflect Sailors’ daily activities afloat. 
Haynes found that, when using the Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST), many 
Sailors’ predicted effectiveness level was at or below 80%, indicating that a majority of 
Sailors were operating at less than an optimal level. Additionally, Haynes’s results 
indicate that 85% of participants in his study worked longer than the 81 work hours per 
week allotted by the NSWW. Mason’s (2009) study of LAKE ERIE and PORT ROYAL 
found similar results, and argued that the NSWW does not accurately reflect Sailors’ 
work/rest patterns afloat. Mason found that 85% of his participants exceeded the 81 hours 
of Available Time allotted by the NSWW. Additionally, Mason found that, when using 
the FAST tool, 54% of the participants in his study had predicted effectiveness levels at 
or lower than 65%, indicating that a majority of these Sailors were operating at seriously 
degraded levels of effectiveness. 
G. HUMAN PERFORMANCE MODEL AND TOOL 
Researchers from the Air Force Research Laboratory, Brooks Air Force Base 
(AFB); Walter Reed Army Institute of Research; Federal Railroad Association; NTI, Inc.; 
and Science Application International Corporation (SAIC) worked together to develop 
the Sleep, Activity, Fatigue, Task Effective (SAFTE) model, and FAST. SAFTE, a model 
used to predict fatigue, predicts how circadian rhythm and sleep/wake stages impact 
humans’ cognitive process and performance. The model predicts workers’ fatigue, 
optimizes scheduling to reduce human performance error, and improves safety, 
effectiveness, and quality of life (Eddy & Hursh, 2001). This model predicts human 
vigilance performance for numerous work schedules at various levels of sleep 
deprivation. See Figure 5 for the SAFTE model. 
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Figure 5. SAFTE Model (From: Eddy & Hursh, 2001). 
The SAFTE model begins at the lower center block titled Sleep Reservoir. The 
jagged lines within the block indicate levels of the sleep reservoir. At the trough, the 
sleep reservoir is entirely depleted, while at the peak, the reservoir is full. The Sleep 
Reservoir is filled during sleep and depletes while awake. This reservoir is filled based 
upon an individual’s sleep quality and sleep intensity. Sleep intensity is based upon the 
time of day (circadian process) and sleep reservoir level (sleep debt), and sleep quality is 
determined by the amount of sleep fragmentation (Hursh, Redmond, Johnson, Throne, 
Belenky, Balkin, Storm, Miller, & Eddy, 2004). The end result of the model is to predict 
the effectiveness of an individual’s human performance. 
FAST uses the SAFTE model to estimate an individual’s predicted effectiveness, 
especially vigilance. FAST is a tool developed to assist in scheduling work activities and 
rest periods, and it predicts fatigue under various work/rest schedules. Using this tool to 
schedule work/rest patterns can facilitate optimization of human performance. 
FAST allows a user to predict cognitive performance . . . provides the 
military planner the ability to optimize performance under conditions of 
limited sleep and minimizes the need for pharmacological aids. (Eddy & 
Hursh, 2001, p. 1) 
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Additionally, FAST allows users to calculate an individual’s circadian rhythm and 
performance compared to a blood alcohol equivalent (BAE). Figure 6 is a depiction of a 
FAST chart. 
 
Figure 6. FAST Chart (After: Miller et al., 2007). 
The blue- and red-shaded bars at the bottom of the chart indicate the work and 
rest activities that an individual experiences throughout the day and night. Colors on the 
bars correlate to activity: blue indicates sleep, while red indicates work. The scale on the 
left-hand side of the chart indicates the level of effectiveness (0%-100%). The lower red 
horizontal band indicates an individual’s predicted effectiveness at levels less than 65%. 
The yellow band indicates an individual's predicted effectiveness at levels between 65% 
and 90%. The green band is the optimal level and represents predicted effectiveness 
levels above 90%. Dates are specified at the top of the chart and time, in a 24-hour span, 
is annotated at the bottom of the chart. The FAST tool can be used to assist leaders in 
scheduling Sailors’ work/rest patterns in order to minimize the potential operational risk 
associated with sleep-deprived and fatigued Sailors. 
Early AM dip in 
performance 
















H. OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT (ORM) 
“ORM is a decision-making tool used by military personnel at all levels, to 
increase operational effectiveness by anticipating hazards and reducing the potential for 
loss, thereby increasing the probability of a successful mission” (OPNAVINST 
3500.39B, 2004, p. 7). ORM is the primary tool used to minimize operational risk 
onboard U.S. Navy vessels. To evaluate ORM, military leaders must continuously be 
aware that fatigue, lack of sleep, and sleep deprivation pose a risk of loss of life, and 
lessen the probability of a successful mission. The Navy, therefore, should not take 
fatigue-related performance lightly, as it is a concern for all modes of transportation since 
human performance errors are frequently identified as the cause of accidents (Dinges, 
1995).  Irregular sleep patterns, coupled with fatigue, will have an adverse impact upon 
ORM and the safety of ship and crew (Haynes, 2007). 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This research was an observational study of Sailors’ work/rest patterns aboard  
USS RENTZ (FFG 46). The data collected was used to conduct a comparative analysis of 
Sailors’ actual recorded work/rest patterns with the NSWW model. 
A. PARTICIPANTS 
Fifty Sailors volunteered to take part in the research. The age of the participants 
ranged from 19 to 45, and participants’ race and gender varied. Volunteers (officers and 
enlisted) represented a subset of the ship’s overall manning to include various rates, 
ranks, skills, years of experience, departments, Navy Enlisted Code (NEC) specialty,  
and watchstations. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION AND DATA COLLECTION OF SLEEP DATA 
1. Institutional Review Board 
The research was submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School’s Institutional 
Review Board (IRB). The purpose of submission was to determine the risk that 
participants would encounter by taking part in this research. The IRB indicated minimal 
to no risk was involved in the research. Prior to the research, participants were fully 
briefed and signed consent forms. See Appendix A for a copy of the Informed  
Consent Form. 
2. Data Collection 
a. Daily Activity Log 
Each participant was provided with a Daily Activity Log (Figure 7). The 
log sheet was dated from May 5, 2009 to June 5, 2009, capturing the total number of days 
underway. The first six days of data collection, before the ship was underway, allowed 
time for participants to become familiar with wearing the wrist activity monitors 
(WAMs), annotating daily activity, and FAST program preconditioning. FAST 
preconditioning accounts for Sailors not being well-rested prior to research. Each line of 
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the log covered a span of 24 hours, blocked into 15-minute intervals. Each participant 
was instructed to log daily activities to the nearest 15-minute interval each day of the 
study. Additionally, each participant was instructed to annotate their WAM identification 
number at the top of their respective Daily Activity Log. The log was divided into both 
on duty (available) and off duty (nonavailable) time. Available Time includes 
maintenance, training, meeting watch, and service diversion, while Nonavailable Time 
includes sleep, messing, personal time, and Sunday’s free time. 
 
Figure 7. Participants’ Daily Activity Log 
 21
b. Wrist Activity Monitor (WAM) 
WAMs (Figure 8) were distributed to all participants, who were instructed 
to wear the WAM at all times, excluding evolutions onboard the ship that required 
removal of the WAM. If participants removed the watch, they were instructed to annotate 
such event on their Daily Activity Log by writing “off.” Each WAM had an identification 
number and that number was logged on the Daily Activity Log to ensure that the WAMs 
corresponded to their respective activity log. 
 
Figure 8. Wrist Activity Monitor (From: Mason, 2009) 
c. Data Analysis 
Participants were briefed on equipment (WAM and Daily Activity Log) 
usage prior to getting underway. Upon completion of the underway period, the Daily 
Activity Logs and WAMs were collected from each participant. Data from the Daily 
Activity Logs were entered into Microsoft Excel spreadsheets for initial comparison to 
the NSWW model. Next, WAM data corresponding to the respective activity log data 
were downloaded using the Actiware 5.0 program. Data were examined to verify 
participants’ sleep time. Following this step, the data were exported into FAST for 
additional analyses. Once the data were imported into FAST, they were compared to the 
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actigraphic data to ensure that Sailors were actually sleeping and working when stated. 
Following the examination of participants’ sleep and work activity, participants’ 




Work and rest data from May 11, 2009 through June 4, 2009 were analyzed to 
capture a 3-week period. The ship’s port visit, May 22 through May 25, was excluded 
from the analysis. 
A. DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS 
Initially, 50 Sailors volunteered to take part in this research. At the end of data 
collection, only 24 of the original 50 volunteers completed the Daily Activity Log and 
wore WAMs. The 26 participants who did not complete the study failed to do so for 
various reasons, including injuries, loss of their WAMs, and failure to complete the Daily 
Activity Log. All 24 participants who completed the research were males and their 
average age was 31. 
Participants included officers (n=3) and enlisted personnel (n=21) from various 
watchstations, rates, ranks, and departments including operations (n=6), combat systems 
(n=4), engineering (n=3), supply (n=4), and navigation and administration (NavAdmin) 
(n=4). The letter “n” denotes the number of participants. The number of participants by 
department refers only to enlisted Sailors who participated and excludes officers. 
B. NAVY STANDARD WORKWEEK (NSWW) VERSUS SAILORS’ SELF-
REPORTED WORK/REST PATTERNS (BY WEEK AND PER DAY) 
To determine if the NSWW (afloat) accurately estimates the total number of hours 
Sailors work each week, each participant was asked to fill out a Daily Activity Log. Each 
log covered a span of 24 hours, blocked into 15-minute intervals, starting at 0000 and 
ending at 2359 each day. Each participant logged their daily activities to the nearest  
15-minute interval. Activities included these categories: Maintenance, Training, Service 
Diversion, Watch, Sleep, Messing, Personal Time, and Free Time. The Daily Activity 
Logs were used to determine how much time each Sailor spent on each category. That 
information was then compared to the NSWW model from the Manual of Navy Total 
Force Manpower Policies and Procedures (OPNAVINST 1000.16K, 2007) to determine 
if the NSWW accurately reflects Sailors’ self-reported time. For the purpose of this 
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research, personal time and free time were combined because participants used the terms 
interchangeably, i.e., Sunday free time was reported as personal time. 
Table 3 shows the average of the enlisted Sailors’ weekly self-reported work and 
rest patterns. The results show that participants worked, on average, 20.24 hours more 
than the time allotted per week for maintenance. Training time, 2.08 hours per week, was 
consistently below the seven hours allotted for each week by the NSWW. With respect to 
service diversion (meetings), the time exceeds the allotted time per week in the NSWW 
model by 7.93 hours. The average time spent standing watch per week is 16.56 fewer 
hours than allotted for by the NSWW model. All participants slept approximately 8.98 
fewer hours per week than allotted by the NSWW. Self-reported mess time was at 6.99 
hours less than the time set forth in the NSWW model, while personal time was 9.29 
hours more than the time allotted for in the NSWW model per week. 
 
Table 3.   RENTZ Average Number of Hours per Week 
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Results indicate that 61% of Available Time of enlisted Sailor study participants 
exceeds the NSWW model of 81 hours per workweek afloat. Figure 9 indicates that the 
NSWW allotted 81 hours per week for Available (work) Time. The bars to the left of the 
yellow NSWW bar indicate participants whose Available Time is fewer than 81 hours a 
week, whereas the bars to the right of the NSWW indicate participants whose Available 
Time is in excess of the time allocated by the NSWW model. See Appendix F for a 
summary table of Sailors’ reported Available and Nonavailable Time. 
 
Figure 9. Summary of Available (Work) Time Over a 3-Week Period for Enlisted 
Participants 
Table 4 indicates averages for self-reported work and rest patterns of enlisted 
Sailors broken down per day. The results indicate that participants worked 2.89 hours per 
day more than allotted for maintenance. Training time, 0.30 hours per day, was 
consistently below the one hour allotted by the NSWW model. In general, reported 
service diversion (meetings) exceeded the time allotted in the NSWW model by 1.13 per 
day hours. The average time spent standing watch per day was 2.37 fewer hours than the 
NSWW model. On average, enlisted Sailors slept approximately 1.28 fewer hours per 
day than the NSWW. Self-reported mess time was one hour less than the allotted time set 
forth in the NSWW model, while personal time was 1.33 hours per day more than the 
time allotted for in the NSWW model. 
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Table 4.   Average Number of Hours per Day Spent in Various Activities 
Table 5 compares RENTZ weekly averages to the NSWW. Due to the small 
sample size, a Mann-Whitney U Test was used. The Mann-Whitney U test for the 
equality of means revealed significant differences between RENTZ participants and the 
NSWW for maintenance, training, watch, sleep, messing, and personal time. 
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Comparison of RENTZ Weekly Averages to NSSW 
      
NSSW RENTZ   
        (n=21) 
Available Time     81 87.69 (168) 
            
  Maintenance** 14 34.24 (105) 
  Trainings*** 7 2.08 (21) 
  Meetings   4 11.93 (189) 
  Watch**   56 39.44 (126) 
            
Non Available Time     87 80.31 (168) 
            
  Sleep***   56 47.02 (42) 






Note: Mann–Whitney U  in parentheses.        
*** p ≤ .000, ** p ≤.01, * p ≤ .05  (two tailed) 
  
Table 5.   Mann-Whitney U Means Test: Comparision of RENTZ Weekly Averages  
to NSWW 
Figure 10 shows of self-reported activities of Participant 728 compared to the 
NSWW. Participant 728 showed the greatest variation from the NSWW. Participant 728 
stood a three-section watch rotation in radio, notionally resulting in 8 hours a day spent 
standing watch. Participant 728’s reported activities were fairly consistent while 
underway. On average, Participant 728 reported standing watch 12.60 hours per day, 
exceeding the NSWW model time by 4.60 hours. He spent 4.21 hours per day conducting 
maintenance, 2.21 hours over the time allotted for in the NSWW model. 
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Figure 10. Reported Activities of Participant 728 Compared to the  
Navy Standard Workweek 
 Participant 728’s reported daily average time training (0.00 hours), messing  
(1.17 hours), and personal time (0.88 hours) per day were consistently less than the time 
allocated by the NSWW model. The average time Participant 728 spent sleeping per day 
was 4.33 hours, 3.67 hours fewer than the allotted time for sleep according to the NSWW 
model. See Appendix C for each participant’s individual self-reported activities 
compared to the NSWW model. 
 Figure 11 displays the aggregated difference between participant 728’s  
self-reported activities and the NSWW model. Maintenance and watch exceeded the time 
allotted by the NSWW model, while the other categories are less than the time allotted by 
the NSWW model. Based upon a 3-week time period, Participant 728 should receive 168 
hours of sleep; however, this particular Sailor received 77 fewer hours of sleep over the 
3-week period than set forth in the NSWW model. 
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Figure 11. Aggregated Difference Between Self-Reported Activities of Participant 
728 and the Navy Standard Workweek Over a Three-Week Period 
 Over all categories, Participant 728 displayed the greatest deviation from the 
NSWW model. Figure 12 illustrates the aggregated deviation in absolute value between 
the self-reported activities of Participant 728 and the NSWW over a 3-week period. 
NSWW categories of maintenance, sleep, and watch standing display the most deviation. 
The method used to determine deviation is based upon the following formula: 
Deviation = (Reported – Allocated) 2 
   Allotted 
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Figure 12. Aggregated Deviation Between Self-Reported Activites of Participant 728 
and the Navy Standard Workweek Over a Three-Week Period 
C. WORK/REST PATTERNS OF SAILORS BY DEPARTMENT 
 Figure 13 depicts the mean distribution of Available Time by departments. The 
Engineering Department’s on average, on duty time is 23.04 hours per week more than 
the Available Time set forth in the NSWW model during the 3-week period. The 
Operations Department’s on average, on duty time is 17.86 hours per week more than the 
Available Time allotted for in the NSWW. On average, the Supply Department’s on duty 
time was 1.02 hours per week more than the NSWW. Combat Systems and NavAdmin 
Department’s on duty time were fewer hours per week than set forth in the NSWW 
model. See Appendix D for the average number of hours per week dedicated toward 
productive work for each participant in their respective departments. 
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Figure 13. Distribution of Available Time by Department 
 Figure 14 illustrates a summary of Available Time for the Engineering 
Department and Figure 15 illustrates the differences in hours for the Engineering 
Department compared to the NSWW model. The Engineering Department averaged 
almost three additional hours of maintenance per day. However, the Engineering 
Department trained 0.27 fewer hours per day than the NSWW model. In reference to 
service diversion (meetings), the Engineering Department allotted 1.87 hours per day 
more than the NSWW model. The Engineering Department stood watch 1.14 fewer hours 
per day than allotted for in the NSWW model. The Engineering Department slept 2.18 
hours less per day than allotted for by the NSWW model. Messing by 0.84 hours and 
personal time by 0.27 hours per day were fewer than allotted for by the NSWW model. 
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Figure 14. Engineering Department Available/Nonavailable Time 
 
Figure 15. Difference in Hours for the Engineering Department versus the  
NSWW Model 
 Figure 16 summarizes Available Time for the Operations Department and  
Figure 17 illustrates the differences in hours for the Operations Department compared to 
the NSWW model. The Operations Department averaged more than 3.22 hours of 
additional time conducting maintenance per day. The Operations Department trained  
0.81 hours less per day than provided by the NSWW model. With respect to service 
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diversion, the Operations Department exceeded the one hour set forth in the NSWW 
model by 0.13 hours. The Operations Department watchstanders stood watch 0.95 hours 
less per day than the NSWW model. The Operations Department slept 1.36 hours less per 
day than that allotted for by the NSWW model. Messing per day was 1.17 hours fewer 
than allotted by the NSWW, while personal time (0.94 hours) exceeded the allotment of 
NSWW model. 
 
Figure 16. Operations Department Available/Nonavailable Time 
 
Figure 17. Difference in Hours for the Operations Department Department versus the 
NSWW Model 
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 Figure 18 illustrates a summary of Available Time for the Combat Systems 
Department and Figure 19 illustrates a difference in hours for the Combat Systems 
Department compared to the NSWW model. The Combat Systems Department averaged 
2.57 hours of additional time conducting maintenance per day. The Combat Systems 
Department trained consistently less (0.84 hours) per day than in the NSWW model. 
With respect to service diversion, the Combat Systems Department exceeded the allotted 
time by 0.92 hours per day. The Combat Systems Department watchstanders stood watch 
3.59 hours per day less than in the NSWW model. Combat Systems Department, per day, 
slept 1.38 hours less than the NSWW model. The Combat Systems Department spent 
0.81 fewer hours per day messing than the NSWW model alloted. Conversely, the 
Combat Systems Department’s personal time exceeded the allotted time per day set forth 
in the NSWW by 3.13 hours. 
 
Figure 18. Combat Systems Department Available/Nonavailable Time 
 
Figure 19. Difference in Hours for the Combat Systems Department versus the 
NSWW Model 
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Figure 20 illustrates Available Time for the Supply Department and Figure 21 
illustrates a difference in hours for the Supply Department compared to the NSWW 
model. Supply Department participants, on average per day, conducted 3.15 hours more 
maintenance than allotted for by the NSWW model. The Supply Department trained  
0.65 fewer hours per day than in the NSWW model. With respect to service diversion, the 
Supply Department spent 0.15 hours less than the time set forth in the NSWW model per 
day. The Supply Department stood watch 2.20 hours less per day than allotted for by the 
NSWW model. The Supply Department participants slept 0.29 hours more per day than 
allotted for in the NSWW model. The Supply Department spent 1.27 fewer hours 
messing per day than allotted for by the NSWW model. The Supply Department’s self-
reported personal time was 0.84 hours more than in the NSWW model. 
 
Figure 20. Supply Department Available/Nonavailable Time 
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Figure 21. Difference in Hours for the Supply Department versus the NSWW Model 
Figure 22 summarizes Available Time for the NavAdmin Department and  
Figure 23 illustrates the difference in hours for the NavAdmin Department compared to 
the NSWW model. The NavAdmin Department conducted maintenance 3.93 hours more 
per day than in the NSWW model. NavAdmin Department participants trained 0.82 fewer 
hours per day than in the NSWW model. In respect to service diversion, the NavAdmin 
Department exceeded the time allotted by the NSWW by 2.76 hours per day. The 
NavAdmin Department stood watch 6.36 hours less per day than the NSWW model 
allotted. In reference to sleep, the NavAdmin Department slept 1.55 hours less per day 
than in the NSWW model. On average per day, the NavAdmin Department spent 0.82 
fewer hours messing than in the NSWW model. The NavAdmin Department participants 
exceeded personal time by 2.86 hours per day. 
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Figure 22. NavAdmin Department Available/Nonavailable Time 
 
Figure 23. Difference in Hours for the NavAdmin Department versus the  
NSWW Model 
 The Combat Systems Department showed the greatest deviation from the NSWW 
in training and personal time; the NavAdmin Department in maintenance, service 
diversion and watch; the Engineering Department in sleep; and the Supply Department  
in messing. 
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 According to the NSWW model, Sailors are allotted eight hours a day to sleep. 
Figure 24 indicates that, on average, all departments’ personnel, excluding supply, slept 
less than eight hours per day. On average, the Engineering Department slept over two 
hours less per day than the NSWW model. The Operations, Combat Systems Department, 
and NavAdmin, on average, slept nearly two hours less per day than the NSWW model 
allotted. 
 
Figure 24. Average Number of Hours Spent Sleeping Categorized by Department 
versus the Navy Standard Workweek 
The relationship between seniority and sleep was also examined by calculating 
the participants’ average sleep per day by pay grade. Figure 25 shows the average 
number of hours spent sleeping, categorized by pay grade of participants within this 
study, compared to the NSWW model. The results indicate that the higher-ranked Sailors, 
with the exception of E-4s, self-reported sleeping fewer hours than those of lower rank. 
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Figure 25. Average Number of Hours Spent Sleeping Categorized by Pay Grade 
versus the Navy Standard Workweek 
D. FAST ANALYSIS 
FAST was used to predict Sailors’ effectiveness while standing watch and to 
determine each Sailor’s sleep efficiency. The time frame covered by the FAST analysis is 
from May 11, 2009 at 0800 PST through June 5, 2009 at 0800 PST. Figures 26-28 are 
graphical representations of Sailors’ predicted effectiveness compared to BAE. 
Figure 26 illustrates the worst-case analysis of Sailor’s predicted effectiveness—
Operations Department’s Participant 5318, who had an overall effectiveness of 68.76% 
during the entire study. In one particular case, while standing watch, Participant 5318’s 
predicted effectiveness while awake was 26%. Essentially, during the 48 hours preceding 
the critical event (standing watch) on May 19, 2009, this participant reported sleeping 
fewer than 5 hours. However, it is worth noting that Participant 5318’s predicted 
effectiveness increased to 90% following three days of consecutive sleep during the 
ship’s brief return to homeport for refueling. Once the ship returned to sea, following its 
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homeport visit, Participant 5318’s sleep time decreased and his predicted effectiveness 
decreased from 90% to 48%, following five days of being underway. 
 
Figure 26. Participant 5318’s FAST Analysis 
 
An average case, with respect to predicted effectiveness, is Participant 6188 in the 
Combat Systems Department. Participant 6188’s overall effectiveness while awake was 
82.94%. It is worth noting that Participant 6188’s predicted effectiveness increased to 
89% following three consecutive days of sleep during the ship’s return to homeport. In 
one particular case, while standing watch at 2318 hours, Participant 6188’s predicted 
effectiveness was 43%, which is a BAE level well below 0.08. During the previous  
24 hours of standing watch on May 28, 2009, this participant reportedly slept less than 
three hours. See Figure 27 for a graphical representation of Participant 6188’s FAST 
analysis and average sleep. 
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Figure 27. Participant 6188’s FAST Analysis 
Figure 28 illustrates an optimal-case scenario with respect to predicted 
effectiveness—Participant 6366 of the Supply Department, whose overall effectiveness 
while awake was 96.54%. However, keep in mind that this participant did not stand 
watch as frequently as other participants. In one particular case, while standing watch at 
1059 hours, Participant 6366’s predicted effectiveness was 99%. During the previous  
24 hours, this participant reportedly slept 11 hours. 
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Figure 28. Participant 6366’s FAST Analysis 
The average overall predicted effectiveness for all participants was 84.21%, 
whereas sleep efficiency calculated using actigraphy for all participants was 80.78%. See 
Appendix G for each participant’s FAST analysis, Appendix H for a complete list of 
participants’ average sleep efficiency, and Appendix I for a complete list of participants’ 
overall average performance effectiveness. 
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V. DISCUSSION 
As the United States Navy continues to work toward its goal of maintaining an 
efficient and ever-ready fighting force, adequate measures must be taken to ensure that 
the tools used to assess manpower requirements onboard frigates and other vessels 
adequately reflects the physiological needs of their crews (Miller & Firehammer, 2007). 
There is concern that the current manpower requirements onboard U.S. Navy ships are 
not accurately reflected in the current NSWW model. This concern centers on the number 
of hours working and sleeping that today’s Sailors receive in order to maintain their 
required state of readiness aboard ship, to be able to successfully carry out missions. This 
study was conducted because of concerns about the detrimental effects of fatigue on 
individual performance; in particular, decreasing alertness, slowing reaction time, 
decreased work effectiveness and efficiency, and decreased vigilance (Mohler, 1996; 
Dinges, 1995; National Sleep Foundation, 2006). Previous studies indicate that the 
NSWW does not accurately reflect current Sailors’ work/rest patterns (Miller et al., 2007, 
Haynes, 2007; Mason, 2009). The purpose of this research was to (1) determine the 
actual work/rest patterns of Sailors aboard U.S. Navy frigates; (2) determine if the 
NSWW (afloat) accurately estimates the total number of hours Sailors worked each week 
aboard U.S. Navy frigates; (3) determine if work/rest patterns differed among 
departments aboard U.S. Navy frigates; and (4) recommend whether the NSWW needs to 
be revised to more accurately reflect Sailors’ actual standard workweek by department. 
The findings from this study add to a growing body of literature that supports research 
that the current NSWW model does not accurately reflect Sailors’ work/rest patterns 
aboard various Navy ships. The details and implications of these findings are discussed 
below. 
A. ACTUAL WORK/REST PATTERNS OF SAILORS 
When considering the actual work/rest patterns of Sailors aboard U.S. Navy 
frigates, the results from this study indicate that participants onboard the RENTZ, 
excluding officers, on a weekly average, worked 20.24 more hours than allotted in the 
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NSWW model, and slept 8.98 fewer hours than recommended by the NSWW. This 
means that participants worked 2.89 more hours per day and slept 1.28 fewer hours than 
allotted by the current NSWW model. Overall, 61% of participants’ Available Time (on 
duty—maintenance, watch, training, and service diversion) exceeded the time allotted for 
in the NSWW model of 81 hours per week afloat. These findings are consistent with 
previous studies examining the work/rest patterns of Sailors aboard U.S. Navy cruisers 
and destroyers (Haynes, 2007; Mason, 2009). Haynes (2007) found that Sailors aboard 
U.S. Navy destroyers worked 16.95 hours per week, or 2.42 hours per day, more than 
allotted by the NSWW and slept fewer hours per week. In all, 84% of participants 
exceeded the 81 hours of Available Time allotted for in the NSWW (Haynes 2007). 
Mason (2009) found that Sailors aboard U.S. Navy cruisers worked 9.90 hours per week, 
or 1.41 hours per day more than set forth in the NSWW, and slept approximately 6 hours 
less per week, or 0.86 hours less per day than set forth in the NSWW. In all, 85% of 
participants in Mason’s study exceeded the 81 hours of Available Time allotted by the 
NSWW. The additional hours Sailors work in excess of those being allotted for by the 
current NSWW are being reallocated from Nonavailable Time. Overall, Sailors are being 
overworked and getting inadequate sleep. Despite evidence showing that current crews 
are already working in excess of the time allotted in the current NSWW, the Navy is 
continuing to build more ships, while decreasing crew sizes. A number of studies have 
found that reducing personnel on ships and working longer hours are primary factors in 
causing fatigue (Brown, 1989; Smith et al., 2001; Miller, 2005; Houtman et al., 2005; 
Arendt et al., 2006). Decisions to reduce crew size are currently being justified by the 
increasing availability of automated systems aboard Navy vessels. These decisions do not 
take into consideration literature showing automated systems, combined with fatigued 
operators, inadvertently increases unpredictability in performance (Dinges, 1995). 
Fatigue slows reaction times of operators interacting with automated systems. Dinges 
notes that the physical reaction time of a fatigued operator will be slowed by 5% to as 
much as 25% (1995). What may seem like a justification for reducing crew sizes aboard 
ships may instead increase the likelihood of mishaps aboard Navy vessels in the future. 
Additionally, the combination of smaller crew sizes, over-worked Sailors, and Sailors 
 45
obtaining inadequate sleep may have broader-reaching effects that undermine other Navy 
operations. For example, these factors can impact the Navy’s ability to retain highly 
skilled Sailors and the ability of Sailors to properly care for their ship (i.e., failing Board 
of Inspections and Survey) (Smith et al., 2001; Ewing, 2009). 
B. VARIATION BY DEPARTMENT AND SHIP TYPE 
By department, the distribution of Available Time varied the most among hours 
allotted for watch, sleep, maintenance, and training. In particular, all participants in the 
Engineering, Operations, and Supply Department exceeded the weekly Available Time of 
81 hours set forth by the NSWW, whereas those in the Combat Systems and NavAdmin 
Department did not. These findings illustrate the need to consider how work and rest 
patterns differ across departments aboard Navy vessels. Some departments had small 
deviations from the NSWW, whereas other departments varied greatly. The difference for 
departments, on average per day, varied from 2.83 to 3.93 hours in maintenance, –0.84 to 
–0.27 hours in training, –0.15 to 2.76 hours in service diversion, –6.36 to –0.95 hours in 
watch, –2.18 to 0.29 hours in sleep, –1.17 hours to –0.81 hours in messing, and –0.27 to 
3.13 hours in personal time. In his study, Haynes (2007) found that the Combat Systems 
Department conducted the most maintenance, while the Operations Department slept the 
least on U.S. Navy destroyers. Similarly, Mason (2009) found that the Combat Systems 
Department conducted the most maintenance, while the Operations Department slept the 
least aboard U.S. Navy cruisers. However, in the current research, the NavAdmin 
Department was found to have conducted the most maintenance, while the Engineering 
Department slept the least. 
With respect to ship type, Haynes (2007), Mason (2009), and the current study 
indicated that Sailors were overworked and obtained inadequate sleep. While these 
studies were conducted on three different types of Navy vessels (cruisers, destroyers, and 
frigates), they all find that the NSWW does not reflect Sailors’ actual work/rest patterns 
on any of these ship types. These combined results suggest Sailors’ work/rest patterns 
may be dependent upon the department and ship type. Although these three studies 
(Haynes, 2007; Mason, 2009; and the current study) were consistent in their finding that, 
overall, Sailors’ activities are not accurately reflected by the NSSW, still future studies 
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should remain vigilant about potential variations in work/rest patterns by ship type. 
Future studies should consider how workloads across departments may affect overall 
work/rest patterns found onboard Navy vessels. Findings show that variations in 
work/rest patterns by ship’s department and ship type determines Sailors’ Available and 
Nonavailable Time; therefore, a future recommendation suggests that a standardized 
NSWW model take into consideration variations by ship type and department. 
C. HOW PAY GRADE AFFECTS SLEEP 
A significant finding in this study was the variation of sleep patterns by rank 
among participants. With the exception of E-4s, higher-ranking Sailors’ self-reports and 
actigraphy (the monitored reports of Sailors’ rest and activity cycle) show that they 
receive less sleep than lower-ranking Sailors. As Sailors advance in seniority, the 
requirements to exercise problem-solving and decision-making skills increase, thus, 
making it even more important for those higher-ranking Sailors to obtain adequate sleep. 
Higher-ranking Sailors who neglect their sleep could potentially place the ship and its 
crew in harm’s way, leading to catastrophic operational failure (Shay, 1998). In short, 
lack of sleep may lead to disastrous leadership decisions (Belenky, 1997; Shay, 1998). 
D. PREDICTED PERFORMANCE EFFECTIVENESS 
The average predicted effectiveness of participants in this study from  
May 11, 2009 to June 4, 2009, including officers, was 84.21%. Predicted effectiveness 
refers to an individual’s predicted cognitive performance level, especially vigilance, 
based upon sleep, sleep inertia, and circadian rhythm. This percentage is acceptable 
considering a fully compliant Sailor has a predicted effectiveness level of 83.25% 
(Haynes, 2007). Still, 41% of the participants had a predicted effectiveness level below 
83.25%. Thirty-three percent of the Sailors in this study had a predicted effectiveness 
level of 80% or lower, suggesting that these Sailors were chronically fatigued. Haynes 
(2007) found similar results, as less than half of the Sailors (41%) in his study had a 
predicted effectiveness level equal to or above 83.25%. The majority (56%) of his 
participants had a predicted effectiveness level of 80% or lower, suggesting that a 
majority of Sailors were chronically fatigued and not operating at an optimal level. The 
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finding, which suggests that among a given subsample of Sailors aboard Navy destroyers, 
less than half are performance-ready is alarming, based upon literature stating that as 
fatigue develops and worsens, so do mircosleeps and performance lapses (Dinges, 1995). 
The data in this current study and others suggest that the performance of almost half the 
Sailors aboard Navy vessels is unreliable and unpredictable. The dangers of having a 
fatigued workforce leads to increased anxiety, decreased work effectiveness and 
efficiency, decreased vigilance, increased irritability, decreased attention span, increased 
susceptibility to error, and increased mishaps (Mohler, 1966; Dinges, 1995; National 
Sleep Foundation, 2006). These factors are not desirable characteristics of Sailors who 
are in a high-risk operational environment, where they are required to be constantly 
vigilant. Furthermore, long-term fatigue can become a medical cost issue to the Navy, as 
continuous exposure to fatigue may lead to clinical illnesses such as hypertension, peptic 
ulcer, migrant headache, and cardiovascular disease (Mohler, 1966; Knutsson, 2000). 
E. THE IMPORTANCE OF SLEEP EFFICIENCY 
Sleep efficiency is an objective measurement, stated in percentage, of the amount 
of time spent asleep in bed (Medical India Networking for Health, 2009). Sleep 
efficiency greater than 80% is normal, whereas sleep efficiency of less than 80% 
indicates insomnia. While the overall sleep efficiency for participants in this research was 
80.78%, FAST results from this study indicated that 40% of the participants’ predicted 
sleep efficiency level was less than 80%. Sleep efficiency is an indication of the quality 
of the sleep that individuals are receiving and is directly linked to an individual’s 
predicted performance. There is a significant difference between the “quantity” of sleep 
and the “quality” of sleep that an individual receives. While 8 hours of logged sleep 
seems to quantitatively fulfill Sailors’ sleep requirements, it can be rationally assumed 
that a Sailor’s predicted performance after receiving 8 hours of continuous, uninterrupted 
sleep will differ significantly from that of a Sailor who also logs 8 hours of 
noncontinuous, interrupted sleep in nonoptimal conditions (Miller et al., 2007). 
Researchers suggests that higher sleep quality for Sailors can be obtained by eliminating 
sleep disruption in berthing areas by reducing the ringing of bells, limiting the passing of  
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words, limiting executive officers’ berthing inspections while Sailors are sleeping, 
masking machinery noise from machinery compartments adjacent to berthing, improving 
air quality, and reducing ambient light (Miller et al., 2007). 
F. LIMITATIONS 
Notwithstanding the important contributions of this study to the literature 
evaluating the current NSSW model, there are important methodological and practical 
considerations that should be taken into account for future studies wishing to expand 
upon these findings. The limitations confine the extent to which the conclusions 
presented here can be inferred to larger populations. These limitations include problems 
with self-reports, sample size, and dropout rate. It is important to note that some 
allowance is made for human error, in that participants do not accurately estimate times 
for various activities. Accordingly, the researcher made certain inferences of how time 
was allocated by comparing Sailors’ self-reports against data from their actigraphy. In 
addition, the forms that participants used to log data did not ask participants to evaluate 
the quality of sleep that they received. Consequently, quantitative assessments about total 
hours of sleep, sleep efficiency, and performance effectiveness do not take into 
consideration qualitative evaluations of these measures. It is important to factor in the 
small sample size of participants (n=24) who successfully completed this study for the 
overall research and within each department. Keeping this in mind, no statistical 
inferences can be made to the entire population of Sailors aboard U.S. Navy frigates. 
Another factor to note in this study is the dropout rate, which for this study was almost 
50%. Such a high dropout rate is of particular importance to this study, as there may be a 
significant difference in the workloads of those participants who completed the study 
from those that did not. The process of logging and keeping track of Available Time and 
Nonavailable Time is a time-consuming one, potentially suggesting that those who were 
able to complete this study may differ in the amount of Available Time from those who 
were unable to do so. Those participants who were unable to complete the study, 
representing almost half of the starting volunteers, may have sleep efficiency, predicted 
effectiveness levels, and work/rest patterns significantly different than those who  
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successfully completed data collection. Taken into consideration, the missing data from 
these dropped-out participants might have significantly changed the overall averages 
presented in this study. 
Future studies should consider methodological improvements in observing and 
collecting data reflecting the work/rest patterns of Sailors that supplement Sailors’  
self-reports and actigraphy reports. Despite these limitations, the NSWW is a critical 
driving factor in determining manning aboard ships. Thus, all available measures should 
be utilized in ensuring that the NSWW more accurately reflects Sailors’ actual work/rest 
patterns afloat. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The NSWW model is used as a tool to assist NAVMAC in determining 
manpower aboard ships and to assist leaders in properly scheduling Sailors’ work and 
rest schedules. In order for the model to be effective, leaders must be familiar with the 
model, use the model as a tool to schedule Sailors’ workweeks, and ensure that the model 
accurately reflects Sailors’ actual work and rest patterns. The NSWW was last revised in 
2001, which led to an increase in productive work (workload) per Sailor; however, the 
manpower aboard ships did not increase. 
Today’s Sailors not only prepare for war, but are also called on to conduct 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW includes, but is not limited 
to, supporting efforts in resolving conflicts, promoting peace, and assisting in 
humanitarian efforts and crises, both international and domestic. Consequently, these 
additional requirements demand additional time from Sailors. The new challenges of 
today’s Navy require more out of Sailors than in the past. The current NSWW model 
does not reflect these additional requirements, nor does it take into consideration a 
Sailor’s physiological requirements for adequate sleep and rest, as suggested by some 
researchers (Miller & Firehammer, 2007). The data from this study showed that the 
NSWW does not accurately reflect Sailors’ activities, such as that Sailors work more 
hours than allotted and obtain inadequate amounts of sleep compared to those amounts 
set forth in the current NSWW. As a result, almost half of Sailors participating in this 
study fell below acceptable predicted effectiveness levels and had poor sleep efficiency. 
In addition, this study found that higher-ranking Sailors slept fewer hours than  
lower-ranking Sailors. Lastly, the distribution of Available Time varied by department. 
 The results of this study indicate that the NSWW does not accurately reflect the 
activities of today’s Sailors. Similar results were found on U.S. Navy cruisers and 
destroyers during studies by Haynes (2007) and Mason (2009). Navy leaders can use 
information from the FAST analysis to assistance in scheduling Sailors’ work/rest 
patterns and to drive home the fact that performance is linked to sleep. Without adequate 
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sleep, Sailors’ performance will be substandard. This study concludes that the NSWW 
model should be revisited to determine if it accurately reflects the workplace of today’s 
Sailors, who are facing additional challenges and requirements afloat. 
 The daily operational environment that Sailors encounter while underway, is both 
physically and mentally demanding. Leaders must ensure that Sailors are fully prepared 
to carry out their duties and assignments during peace and war. To add to this already 
demanding situation, overworked and sleep-deprived Sailors will lead to a fatigued 
workforce. It is important that fatigue onboard ships not be dismissed nor thought of as a 
necessary evil or part of the Navy’s culture. Fifty years of extensive scientific research 
documents the negative impact of lack of sleep and fatigue. While other remedies, such 
as changes in staffing, and educating personnel on the effects of fatigue, are instrumental 
in improving Sailor effectiveness aboard Navy vessels, the only proven remedy to 
recover from lack of sleep is sleep. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The key findings from this study showed that the NSWW does not accurately 
reflect Sailors’ activities, since Sailors work more hours and obtain less sleep compared 
to those amounts set forth in the current NSWW. As a result, almost half of the Sailors 
participating in this study fell below acceptable predicted effectiveness levels. In 
addition, this study found that higher-ranking Sailors slept fewer hours than lower-
ranking Sailors. Lastly, variation existed by departments in reference to the distribution 
of Available Time. Based upon these key findings, the following recommendations 
should be taken into consideration. 
1. Recommendations for Future Studies 
While the ship was underway, RENTZ was conducting military exercises; 
however, the conditions during the exercises were similar to, but not exactly, wartime 
conditions. As a result, it is highly recommended that researchers wishing to understand 
the actual work/rest patterns of Sailors repeat the study over a longer time span and in 
warlike conditions. The recommendation to conduct similar studies over a longer period 
of time, while in warlike conditions, is supported by various studies (Miller et al., 2007; 
 53
Haynes, 2007; Mason, 2009). The direct benefit of expanding the time frame of this study 
during warlike conditions is to arrive at more accurate estimates of Sailors’ workloads in 
a wartime environment for the NSWW. 
It is highly recommended that similar types of research be repeated using a larger 
sample of the populations (i.e., Sailors and ship type), including officers, aboard 
additional frigates and other vessel types (i.e., Littoral Combatant Ships and DDG1000 
Zumwalt Class). The current study was conducted on one frigate, with a small sample 
size. It may be difficult to differentiate Sailors’ activities that may be unique to one type 
of ship. Therefore, conducting this study on additional ship types will help to determine if 
ship types and accompanying departments have unique workloads (Miller et al., 2007). 
Additionally, conducting this type of study on the DDG1000 Zumwalt smartship, which 
is more automated, may determine how Sailors’ work/rest patterns onboard a ship type 
whose crew size is reduced by 60%–70% compares to the NSWW. 
Despite the fact that the NSWW does not include officers, based upon this study’s 
results showing high-ranking Sailors sleeping fewer hours, particular attention should be 
focused on officers’ sleep regimen. Higher-ranking Sailors, officers in particular, are 
responsible for leading Sailors, directing Sailors, and making effective decisions. A 
problem exists when key individuals in charge receive the least amount of sleep. 
Research should be conducted in tandem with IMPRINT (Gunzelmann & Gluck, 
2008). IMPRINT is a task network modeling tool used to set realistic system 
requirements based upon system design, and evaluate the capabilities of manpower and 
personnel, to effectively operate a system under various environmental stressors (e.g., 
fatigue). The tool allows cognitive effectiveness algorithms from SAFTE to be 
downloaded into IMPRINT software, allowing cognitive effectiveness predictions. 
IMPRINT output will allow researchers to develop human performance models to 
estimate manpower requirements for ship type and department. This tool can be used to 
complement FAST findings in reference to sleep efficiency and predicted performance, 
with regard to departmental workloads and even ship type. 
Each department aboard a ship has varying requirements and responsibilities, and 
the NSWW should reflect these variations. Based upon Haynes (2007), Mason (2009), 
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and this study, a departmental NSWW may need to be developed for each respective 
department and, possibly, each ship type. Haynes found that the Combat Systems 
Department conducted the most maintenance, while the Operations Department slept the 
least on U.S. Navy destroyers. Similarly, Mason found that the Combat Systems 
Department conducted the most maintenance, while the Operations Department slept the 
least aboard U.S. Navy cruisers. However, in the current research, it was found the 
NavAdmin Department conducted the most maintenance, while the Engineering 
Department slept the least. As a result, the NSWW model may not be able to be 
standardized across all ships and departments. 
2. Recommendations for the United States Navy 
It is recommended that Sailors in all pay grades be educated on the importance of 
sleep and the importance of scheduling Sailors’ work/rest schedules to minimize the 
likelihood of Sailors’ circadian desynchronization, sleep deprivation, and fatigue (i.e., 
required General Military Training). Educating Sailors about fatigue and how it impacts 
human performance may help the Navy guard against and recognize the onset of fatigue 
(Dinges, 1995). Shay (1998) stated that legitimate self-care (i.e., obtaining adequate 
sleep) should be taught within the officer corps itself. This suggests that leaders must be 
educated on self-care so that junior Sailors will emulate their leaders. Some researchers 
also believe that educating Sailors on the signs of fatigue might make them more alert to 
its effects, realizing that an adequate amount of sleep is the best solution for countering 
fatigue. 
Accordingly, from findings of this study and other similar studies, it is 
recommended that the NSWW be revisited to determine if the current model is a good fit 
for the additional challenges and requirements facing today’s Sailors while afloat. Miller 
et al. (2007) suggest that adjusting the NSWW to allow for 9 hours of sleep per day will 
reduce the Navy’s productive workweek by 7 hours per week. Doing so will increase the 
afloat staffing requirement and more accurately reflect Sailors’ ability to sustain combat 
capability beyond a couple of days (Miller et al., 2007), as required in Conditions I and 
II. 
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3. Recommendations for Follow-On Study 
Those planning to conduct a follow-on study of this topic should keep in mind 
that buy-in from the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, and Command Master 
Chief is vital. Buy-in from ship leaders will drive home the importance of the study and 
Sailors will be more apt to volunteer. The researcher may desire to go one step further 
and obtain the Commanding Officer superior’s buy-in.  
Some problems that were encountered during the study include: (1) what 
department Food Service Attendants (FSA) fall under; (2) participants losing their Daily 
Activity Logs; (3) participants not logging their sleep quality as excellent, good, or poor; 
(4) accountability for watches, and (5) participants departing ship to attend school.  A 
participant can be a Yeoman in the NavAdmin Department; however, during their time as 
an FSA, the Sailor will fall under the Supply Department, not the NavAdmin Department. 
Numerous participants lost their Daily Activity Log. To overcome this problem, the 
researcher should provide the ship point of contact with additional hard copies and an 
electronic copy of Daily Activity Logs to resupply the ones that were lost. All 
participants’ sleep was recorded as excellent, thus impacting predicted sleep efficiency. 
By Sailors indicating all sleep episodes as excellent, the predicted sleep efficiency may 
be overstated. Researchers should tell participants to indicate sleep quality on their Daily 
Activity Logs. The Researcher and Point of Contact aboard ship should maintain a list 
documenting which Sailors have a watch, to maintain accountability. Lastly, it should be 
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APPENDIX A. PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
Informed Consent Form 
 
Introduction. You are invited to participate in a research study entitled A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN THE NAVY STANDARD WORKWEEK 
AND THE WORK/REST PATTERNS OF SAILORS ABOARD U.S. NAVY 
FRIGRATES being conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School Operations Research 
Department. 
 
Procedures. You will be asked to wear a wristwatch data collection device continuously, 
to include normally scheduled sleep periods. In addition, you will be asked to fill out a 
daily activity log with specific information related to your schedule, particularly times 
related to sleep and rest periods. This experiment will take approximately 25 days to 
complete. 
 
Risks. The potential risks of participating in this study does not involve greater than 
minimal risk and involves no known reasonably foreseeable risks or hazards greater than 
those encountered in everyday life.  A potential risk of participating in this study is a 
breach of confidentiality. However, this is very unlikely given the only identification 
factor is a code number. 
 
Benefits. Anticipated benefits from this study are to ensure the NSWW (afloat) model 
more accurately estimates the standard workweek for Sailors aboard U.S. Navy ships to 
ensure missions effectiveness, increase human performance, and increase the overall 
safety of U.S. Navy ships. 
 
Compensation. No tangible compensation will be given.  A copy of the research results 
will be available at the conclusion of the experiment from LT Kim Green 
(kygreen@nps.edu). 
 
Confidentiality & Privacy Act. Any information that is obtained during this study will 
be kept confidential to the full extent permitted by law. All efforts, within reason, will be 
made to keep your personal information in your research record confidential but total 
confidentiality cannot be guaranteed.  No information will be publicly accessible which 
could identify me as a participant. I will be identified only as a code number on all 
research forms/data bases. My name on any signed document will not be paired with my 
code number in order to protect my identity. Only the researchers will have access to the 
data. However, it is possible that the researcher may be required to divulge information 
obtained in the course of this research to the subject’s chain of command or other legal 
body. 
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study. Participation in this study is strictly voluntary, and if 
agreement to participation is given, it can be withdrawn at any time without prejudice. 
 58
Points of Contact. It is understood that should any questions or comments arise regarding 
this project, or a research related injury is received, the Principal Investigator, Dr. Nita L. 
Miller, 831-656-2281, nlmiller@nps.edu or LT Kim Y. Green, USN, (831) 495-8553, 
kygreen@nps.edu should be contacted. Any other questions or concerns may be addressed 
to the Navy Postgraduate School. IRB Chair, LCDR Paul O’Connor , 831-656-3864, 
peoconno@nps.edu. 
 
Statement of Consent. I have read the information provided above. I have been given 
the opportunity to ask questions and all the questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction. I have been provided a copy of this form for my records and I agree to 
participate in this study. I understand that by agreeing to participate in this research and 
signing this form, I do not waive any of my legal rights. 
 
 
________________________________________  __________________ 
Participant’s Signature     Date 
 
 
________________________________________  __________________ 
Researcher’s Signature     Date 
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Actiwatch # _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
1.  Watchstation: ___________________ 
 
2.  Watch Rotation (i.e. Port/Starboard, 3 Section Rotation): _________________ 
 
3.  Rank: _____________ 
 
4.  Rate: _____________ 
 
5.  Age: ______________ 
 
6.  Race: _____________ 
 
7.  Male or Female (circle one) 
 
8.  Department: ____________ 
 
9.  Officer or Enlisted (circle one) 
 
10.  Time in Service: _________ 
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APPENDIX C. DAILY AVERAGE OF SAILORS’ SELF-
REPORTED AVAILABLE AND NONAVAILABLE TIME VERSUS 
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APPENDIX E. WEEKLY AVERAGE OF REPORTED 
AVAILABLE AND NONAVAILABLE TIME FOR USS RENTZ 
VERSUS NSWW MODEL (INCLUDING OFFICERS) 
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APPENDIX F. SUMMARY TABLE OF INDIVIDUAL SAILORS 





APPENDIX G. FAST ANALYSIS 

















































APPENDIX H. FAST OVERALL PREDICTED AVERAGE  
SLEEP EFFICIENCY 
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APPENDIX I. FAST OVERALL PREDICTED AVERAGE 
PERFORMANCE EFFECTIVENESS 
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